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Origins of the Classical Gene 
Concept, 1900–1950: Genetics, 
Mechanistic, Philosophy, 
and the Capitalization 
of Agriculture
Garland E. Allen
ABSTRACT In the period of “classical genetics” (roughly 1915–1950), the com-
mon view of the gene was mechanistic—that is, genes were seen as individual, atomistic 
units, as material components of the chromosomes. Although it was recognized early on 
that genes could interact and influence each other’s expression, they were still regarded 
as individually functioning units, much like the chemists’ atoms or molecules. Although 
geneticists in particular knew the story was more complex, the atomistic gene remained 
the central view for a variety of reasons. It fit the growing philosophy of mechanistic 
materialism in the life sciences, as biologists tried to make their field more quantitative, 
rigorous, and predictive, like physics and chemistry. Conceptually and pedagogically, it 
provided a simple way to depict genes (as beads on a string) that fit with the exciting 
new work on chromosomal mapping. The atomistic gene also fit well with the increas-
ing drive to move capital into agriculture, both for potential patenting purposes and for 
ease of experimental manipulation and prediction. It is the latter point that the present 
essay explores most thoroughly. The rise of agriculture as an industrialized process pro-
vided a context and material support that fueled much of the rapid growth of genetics 
in the first half of the 20th century.
As many of the papers in this special symposium issue discuss, by the 21st cen-tury we have moved well beyond the notion of a gene as a single particulate 
unit coding for a given protein, or especially a single phenotypic trait. Yet notions 
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of genes as some kind of single, particulate entity still persist, especially in textbooks 
and writings about genetics for the general public.
To understand this disjunct between the professional geneticist’s view of genes 
and their complex interactions, and the more widespread public understanding of 
genes as distinct entities, I thought it might be useful to look back 150 years or more 
to the origins of the gene concept, to the origins of Mendelian genetics itself and 
its predecessors. In this process, I would like to raise several questions that I hope 
will illuminate something about how biology was practiced in the early years of the 
20th century and how that understanding has led to the persistence of an older view 
of the gene that can inform our practice and communication about genetics today.
These questions all relate in one way or another to the interaction of biological 
theories and their philosophical, economic, and social contexts. Among the many 
aspects of the historical context in which genetics as a field evolved, five questions 
will form the focus of our attention: (1) how did the early portrayal of the gene, 
at least in the first half of the 20th century, come into being; (2) what particular 
form did that portrayal of the gene take; (3) how was that form perpetuated over 
the period 1900 to 1950; (4) what confluence of factors operated to promote this 
specific view of the gene; and (5) how has that picture of the gene persisted into and 
affected the development of genetics from the late 20th century onwards?
The Concept of the Gene in the Early 20th Century
The view of the gene to which I am referring in this essay is what I designate as 
the mechanical, mechanistic, or atomistic gene, based on the generally pervasive 
philosophy of mechanistic materialism that was highly influential in biology in the 
early and mid-20th century. This view grew out of the confluence of a number 
of factors in late-19th and early-20th-century social and economic developments, 
especially in the United States and England. The atomistic/mechanistic gene was 
a highly successful and resilient concept that eventually became the predominant 
conceptualization. However, this formulation was challenged periodically during 
the first half of the 20th century, and as a result modified to varying degrees. At the 
time of the elucidation of the molecular structure of DNA in 1953, the basic view of 
the gene as an atomistic unit, at a specific physical location (locus) on a chromosome 
and associated with a particular phenotypic trait, was still the predominant picture 
with which most biologists and the public were familiar.
The confluence of factors that had supported this view of the gene included 
the particulate nature of the numerous synthetic theories of heredity developed 
especially in the post-Darwinian period. These theories included the work of 
Darwin himself, but also that of August Weismann, Ernst Haeckel, Carl von Nägeli, 
Hugo de Vries, and a host of other investigators (Robinson 1979).1 Although these 
theories represented an increased interest in the nature of heredity as a biological 
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phenomenon, they were unsatisfactory in varying degrees because of their 
speculative, nonempirical foundations and their inability to predict outcomes in 
plant and animal crosses with any accuracy.
Another factor was the rapid growth of industry in the period between 1870 
and 1920 in both Europe and the United States, which led to an accumulation 
of capital and thus to the need to find new areas of investment. One area that 
had been eyed for decades was agriculture, but it was basically a cottage industry, 
based on small plot holdings and rule-of-thumb practices that were ill-suited to 
providing predictable results and thus large-scale investment. At the same time, 
industrialization and its associated urbanization—which meant fewer workers on 
the farm, and more mouths to feed in the cities—increased the pressure for higher 
agricultural productivity. With government help, especially in the United States, the 
ideal of the industrialization of agriculture became an increasing goal, including not 
only mechanization and attention to environmental conditions such as soil nutrients, 
fertilizers, and the like, but also the development of higher-yield plant and animal 
varieties that could increase productivity per acre (Harwood 1997; Fitzgerald 2003).
Also important during this period was the professionalization of biology: its 
conversion from a more loosely organized community of naturalists isolated in 
widely scattered universities to organized societies of investigators with common 
sets of interests, professional societies, and journals. Concurrently, this period also 
saw the emergence of privately funded and governmental institutions dedicated 
to research in broad areas of biological and genetic science. One major feature 
of the emergence of a more highly professional consciousness among biologists 
was the emphasis on experimental, quantitative science as the hallmark of what 
was often referred to as the “new” biology—emulating, often quite consciously, the 
physical sciences in which these approaches were paramount. Particularly important 
was the fact that experimentation led to the ability to make predictions from, and 
then to test, hypotheses. Experimentation was explicitly touted by many younger 
biologists as superior to purely descriptive and speculative methods, not only for 
epistemological reasons but also for reasons of professionalization. (There is a wide-
ranging literature on professionalization in the sciences, including biology, in the 
later 19th and early 20th centuries; see, for example, Appel 1988).
It was in the development of genetics—and particularly the mechanistic 
conception of the gene—that these various economic, social, and intellectual strands 
found their most successful expression. Genetics became the embodiment of a new 
and more scientific approach to both biological research and economic development.
1There has been much debate as to whether Mendel himself adhered to a particulate concept for what 
he referred to as “factors” or “Elemente,” and no clear consensus has been reached. After its rediscovery 
in 1900, many Mendelians, including William Bateson, interpreted Mendel’s work in a particulate 
paradigm, regardless of what Mendel himself may have actually thought. To be fair, Mendel can be 
read both ways (see Allen 2000, 2003; Brannigan 1979; Kampourakis 2013; Meijer 1983; Olby 1979).
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Mechanistic Materialism and the  
Mechanistic Conception of Life
So, what do we mean by the “mechanistic gene,” or, more broadly, the mechanistic 
materialist philosophy, of which the mechanistic gene was a classic example? It 
was particularly fitting to raise this issue at a conference sponsored by the Jacques 
Loeb Center, since Loeb (1859–1924), an émigré physiologist from Germany to 
the United States in the early 20th century, was known as the most prominent 
spokesperson for the “mechanistic conception of life” at the time. The mechanistic 
materialism of Loeb and many of his contemporaries was based on a core set of 
understandings or philosophical assumptions that stand in opposition to, on the one 
side, vitalistic and other metaphysical, non-materialist epistemologies, and on the 
other, more non-reductionistic views, such as “holism” and “organicism” that were 
being promoted at the time, especially in physiology and psychology. (What later 
came to be known as dialectical materialism also promoted an anti-mechanistic 
stance, but it only began to exert an influence in biology in the interwar period.)
Mechanistic materialism—also referred to as “Mechanism” (with a capital 
M) or “the mechanical philosophy”—can be summarized by the following five 
propositions. First, all phenomena are based on the fundamental processes of matter 
in motion. Mechanistic materialism is therefore generally grounded in one or 
another form of realism—that is, it assumes the existence of a real world accessible 
by our senses directly or indirectly through some form of instrumentation. Second, 
mechanistic materialism holds that the whole of any phenomenon or process is 
equal to the sum of its parts and no more. At the time, this claim was advanced in 
opposition to any appeal to metaphysical forces or entities, such as a “vital force,” 
which had regained a kind of vogue in the early decades of the 20th century and to 
which avowed mechanists such as Loeb were inalterably opposed. According to the 
mechanistic view at the time, all living processes could be explained by reference to 
their chemical and physical components—and nothing more. No vital force existed 
that differentiated living from non-living bodies.
Following from this is the third corollary, that an organism, like any machine, 
is composed of a distinct number and kind of separate parts, each with its own 
characteristics and functions. While the individual parts of organisms—such as 
organelles, cells, or organ-systems—interact with one another, sometimes in 
complex ways like the gears and other parts of machines, the characteristics of 
the parts, separate from each other, determine in a summary, or additive, fashion 
the functioning of the whole. Concomitant with this assumption is the fourth 
proposition, a reductionist methodology that claims, in essence, that in order to 
study complex systems, they must be broken down into their component parts, 
each of which is studied separately and in isolation from others under controlled 
conditions. Once each part is described and understood completely, it is possible to 
explain and predict the functioning of the system as a whole.
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Finally, mechanistic materialists put a large amount of emphasis on experimentation 
as the most rigorous part of scientific practice. Partly because they drew much 
of their inspiration in the early 20th century from physics and chemistry, where 
experimentation was a key element, mechanistically oriented biologists sought 
to move their field from the merely observational to the experimental mode. 
Experimentation allowed the testing of hypotheses that simple observation often 
did not. Experimentation was also a way to rid biology of speculative theories: those 
that could not be tested were considered superficial and a waste of time.
This mechanistic approach was adopted by a variety of biologists, especially the 
younger generation born in the late 1880s and 1890s. It not only placed biology 
on the same philosophical and methodological footing as physics and chemistry, 
in many younger biologists’ view, but it also provided a way to study systems that 
were too complex to investigate as a whole. And while most biologists realized that 
organisms were not “mere machines,” the mechanistic approach was seen as an 
eminently practical and heuristic way of investigating the functioning of biological 
systems.
Although space does not permit discussing alternative approaches at the time—
the so-called “holistic” or “organismic” philosophies that gained some credence in 
the 1920s through the 1940s—it will be useful to point out several of the key 
ways in which they differed from the mechanistic philosophy. To some biologists, 
these differences pointed to the restricted view of biological processes embodied in 
the purely mechanistic approach, especially as it applied to genetics. Without being 
vitalistic, numerous biologists recognized that organisms were not just collections of 
separate parts that could be interchanged at will. (For a more comprehensive review 
of a variety of these approaches, see Normandin and Wolfe 2013.)
One point of difference between mechanistic and more holistic approaches in 
early 20th-century biology lay in the way they framed the relationships between 
the parts of a complex system and the whole. In holistic terms, it was argued that 
an important property of any component of a system is its interaction with other 
components, something that cannot be observed by studying the component in 
isolation. Thus it was argued that as useful as the mechanistic method was in isolating 
and enumerating the various parts of a complex system, it failed to understand the 
nature of the system as a functioning whole because it did not study the interactions 
of its parts. Following from this, holistic materialists claimed that the whole was, 
indeed, greater than the sum of its parts, not because of the introduction of some 
metaphysical element or force (though some did take such an extreme position), but 
because the whole involved the interactions of parts, as well as the characteristics of 
the individual parts in isolation. The recognition of interactions at higher levels of 
organization than the individual parts themselves led to the notion of “emergent 
properties,” those that arise from the interaction of two or more components, and 
that go beyond the properties of the components themselves. Thus, the properties of 
water emerge from the interaction of two hydrogens and one oxygen and are quite 
different from the properties of either hydrogen or oxygen as individual molecules.
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There are other points of difference between a mechanistic and holistic approach, 
especially as embodied in the most systematically developed of these, dialectical 
materialism (which emphasizes the notion of the dynamics of systems being 
revealed by analysis of their contradictory internal processes). The important point 
to emphasize here, however, is that alternative approaches were known and available, 
but were not the point of view that most biologists—especially geneticists—adopted 
in the first three or four decades of the 20th century.
The Mechanistic Materialist Concept of Heredity, 
1860–1900
Mechanistic materialist thinking about heredity was evident in the many theories 
that were proliferating during the late 19th century, for example, in the various 
particulate theories formulated by Charles Darwin (gemmules), Ernst Haeckel 
(plastidules), August Weismann (determinants and biophors), Carl von Nägeli 
(idioplasm), and Hugo de Vries (pangenes) (Deichmann 2010). It is important to 
recognize the extent of this background of particulate thinking, as it influenced 
profoundly the framing of concepts of the “gene” once Mendel’s work was 
rediscovered in 1900. Gloria Robinson’s excellent study, Prelude to Genetics (1979), 
still remains one of the best sources for detailed discussion of, and comparisons 
between, these various models (for shorter summaries, see also Kampourakis 2013; 
Rheinberger 2008). Two examples—Haeckel and Weismann—will indicate how 
widespread the various examples of particulate, or atomistic, thinking in theories of 
heredity were before 1900.
Haeckel’s Theory of Plastidules
Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) not only promoted his morphological program based 
on the biogenetic law, but he also developed his own theory of heredity to fill the 
gap in his own and Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection. Along with August 
Weismann, Haeckel was one of the most prominent supporters and popularizers 
of Darwin in Germany. Like Darwin, Haeckel maintained an important role for 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and his theory of heredity provided a 
mechanism for how it might work. Unlike Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, however, 
which was couched in the biological terms of living units (like gemmules), Haeckel 
framed his theory in mechanical terms, linking it closely with theories in chemistry 
and physics at the time, namely of matter in motion. Robinson (1979) has shown 
how seriously Haeckel took his theory of heredity and its relation to physiology, 
chemistry, and physics.
Haeckel published his hereditary theory in 1876 in a small volume with a big 
title, The Perigenesis of the Plastidule, or the Wave Generation of the Small Vital Particle: 
An Attempt at a Mechanical Explanation of the Elementary Processes of Development. 
Like Darwin, Haeckel assumed that hereditary qualities were transmitted from 
Garland E. Allen
14 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
parent to offspring as particles, or molecules, which he called “plastidules.” What 
was characteristic of these plastidules, in addition to their molecular character, was 
that they were endowed, like all molecules and atoms, with an inherent motion, 
or “vibration” Plastidules were the lowest level of organized molecules that made 
up living protoplasm, the colloidal material of the cell outside of the nucleus, and 
heredity was the process of the transmission from one generation to the next, not 
only of the material plastidule themselves, but also of their form: their frequency and 
amplitude of vibration. Plastidules were endowed with the property of “memory”—
that is, they could reproduce themselves exactly, which they did when cells divided. 
According to Haeckel, exact replication meant that in its reproduction, the plastidule 
transmitted the same vibrational pattern, or wave-motion, as found in the original 
parental form. However, plastidules could also vary—that is, change their vibrational 
pattern—under the influence of external conditions. Here was the means by which 
Haeckel accounted for the origin of variations and the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. But how exactly did external conditions cause variations to occur?
As shown in Figure 1, Haeckel represented the hereditary process in plastidules 
as a branching scheme, in which the larger spheres—for example, the one shown at 
the bottom center—give rise to the smaller ones (daughter plastidules) by division. 
The inherent motion of each plastidule, its “memory,” is designated by the darker 
designs within the spheres. The wavy lines indicate the vibrational motion the 
plastidule transmits during reproduction. The small black geometric shapes and 
arrows represent different environmental factors affecting the plastidules’ vibrational 
motion. Thus, proceeding from bottom to top of the diagram, ancestral plastidules 
produce descendants, each incorporating new variations (different wave motions) 
due to environmental inputs.
It is not surprising that this scheme resembles, in many ways, a phylogenetic tree, 
which is also customarily represented as developing through time from the bottom 
of a page to the top. Haeckel’s representation was purposefully drawn to suggest 
that it is exactly through the modification of plastidules’ motion over successive 
generations that we see the phylogenetically produced differences in the historical 
development of lineages diverging from a common ancestor. Haeckel’s theory of 
heredity fit logically with his biogenetic law and theory of descent. Like Darwin’s 
gemmules, Haeckel’s theory of perigenesis provided a mechanism—in his case a 
quasi-molecular one—for the origin of variations, and thus for creating the raw 
material on which selection could act. He also attempted to apply his theory to 
explain embryonic development, but I do not have space to discuss that mechanism 
here. Suffice it to say that the important point of Haeckel’s scheme is that the 
plastidules are particulate entities (large organic molecules) with the capacity to 
transmit traits and their variants from parent to offspring.
Haeckel’s scheme was a curious mixture of 19th-century mechanistic materialism 
and metaphysical speculation. It is difficult for modern readers to appreciate the 
value of such a speculative scheme, and it was criticized by many of Haeckel’s 
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Figure 1
Haeckel’s diagram representing the units of heredity, the plastidules (larger spheres), which produce the 
smaller spheres by division. The wavy lines indicate the different transmitted vibrations imparted to the 
daughter spheres by various environmental inputs (geometric figures such as triangles, squares, octagons, 
etc). In this way, variations are introduced into the germ line in accordance with 
Haeckel’s neo-Lamarckian theory.
Source: Haeckel 1876, 81.
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contemporaries on just those grounds (Richards 2008; Robinson 1979). Among 
other things, by what physical process does a plastidule’s vibrational motion get 
transmitted to its descendants? Haeckel noted that it was not the actual plastidules 
themselves that were passed on to the germ cells, but their vibrational motions, and 
for him this was no more abstract or metaphysical than physicists’ description of 
the transfer of heat from one body to another as the transfer of increased molecular 
motion. However, an even greater problem for many of Haeckel’s contemporaries 
was his claim that plastidules, like all atoms, were endowed with a kind of universal 
quality he called “soul.” This idea of a grand universal unity in nature reflected 
Haeckel’s background in German transcendental philosophy (known also as 
Naturphilosophie, or “nature philosophy”), the same tradition that gave rise to the 
idealistic notion of the archetype. Because of these rather metaphysical associations, 
a number of biologists found Haeckel’s scheme, while admittedly mechanistic in 
style, simply too speculative in substance to provide any testable hypotheses.
The significance of Haeckel’s theory for the examination of pre-1900 theories of 
heredity, however, is that it reflects Haeckel’s strong propensity to unite the process 
of heredity and organic evolution (along with embryology) as a single coherent 
theory, expressed in some sort of materialistic, mechanical framework. Haeckel 
himself “believed that he was placing the subject of heredity and adaptation on a 
physical and chemical, or to use the term he considered most inclusive, a mechanical 
basis” (Robinson 1979, 48).
Weismann and the Theory of the Continuity of the Germ Plasm
Haeckel’s ideas were rivaled for their sweeping generality by those of his countryman 
and contemporary, August Weismann (1834–1914). A cytologist of considerable 
merit at the University of Freiburg before eye trouble curtailed his laboratory 
work, Weismann turned his attention in the latter half of his career to the study 
of problems such as evolution, embryonic differentiation, and heredity (Churchill 
1968). Early on he became a staunch Darwinian, and like Haeckel, sought to develop 
a comprehensive theory in which evolution, development, and heredity were united 
into a single, overarching theory (Churchill 1986). Weismann is best known today 
for his doctrine of the separation of germ plasm and somatoplasm: the idea that 
cells of the ovary and testes, which give rise to egg and sperm, represent distinct 
cell lines, or lineages, from the earliest stages of cleavage (cell-division) through the 
formation of the adult. Weismann put forward this theory to counteract the neo-
Lamarckian view of the inheritance of acquired characters. After the first one or 
several cleavages, one of the two daughter cells (called blastomeres) was set aside to 
give rise, by further cell divisions, to the reproductive tissue of the adult. The other 
cells give rise to the remainder of the body’s tissues and organ systems.
Because of this complete separation of the germ cell line from the somatic (body) 
cell lines, Weismann argued that changes in somatic cells during the organism’s 
lifetime could not be transmitted from parent to offspring. To demonstrate this 
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point, he carried out a series of experiments on mice, in which he cut off the 
tails for a number of successive generations only to find that the offspring were 
still born with tails of the same average length as the original parents. In response, 
proponents of the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters argued, however, 
that Weismann’s experiment involved mutilations, not truly acquired characteristics 
(as in the case of the continued use or disuse of a part), and thus had no bearing on 
their theory. Nonetheless, the theory of the separation of germ and somatoplasm 
gained a considerable following, and by the early 1900s it had been incorporated 
by many biologists into their understanding of Darwinian theory and Mendelian 
genetics. The issue of the inheritance of acquired characters through use and disuse 
and other forms of environmental effects, however, remained controversial through 
the first three decades of the 20th century.
Weismann went further in his hereditary thinking than merely demonstrating the 
implausibility of the inheritance of acquired characters. In an extremely ambitious 
conceptual scheme, he, like Haeckel, attempted to offer a single, unified explanation 
for evolution, heredity, and embryonic differentiation much more in line with details 
of cell structure and function (Weismann 1892a). Through his own and others’ 
cytological studies detailing the highly regularized but perplexing movements of 
the chromosomes in mitosis and meiosis, Weismann had become convinced that 
the chromosomes were the primary agents of hereditary transmission. To explain 
the process of heredity and development, Weismann speculated that all the cells 
of the body, both germ and somatic, contained a hierarchical series of particulate 
elements, starting with what he called “idants,” the visible chromosomes in the cell 
nucleus (Figure 2). Idants, in turn, were composed of units called “ids,” arranged 
linearly along the idant. Each id contained all the elements necessary to form a 
complete individual. Ids were composed of “determinants,” complex molecules 
representing the individual characters of the organism (Weismann 1892a, 1892b). 
Determinants were composed of the smallest particles in the hierarchy, which he 
termed “biophors”—organic molecules that were endowed with the properties of 
life and growth, and that chemically determined the development of that cell’s 
specific characteristics. In developing this scheme, Weismann, in accordance with 
the observed facts of cytology, was trying to construct a theory of heredity that was 
ultimately mechanistic and particulate; it would also account for transmission of 
specific traits from one generation to another and the introduction of variation, all 
without recourse to neo-Lamarckian mechanisms. (Like Haeckel, Weismann also 
postulated a mechanism for how his system of units would account for embryonic 
development.)
Weismann’s theory was more detailed, comprehensive, and rooted in then-
known facts about cell structure than either Darwin’s or Haeckel’s. He used his 
observations carefully and, ambitious and premature as it may seem in retrospect, he 
made an honest attempt at unifying the disparate fields of heredity, development, 
and evolution. His ideas were far more carefully worked out than those of Haeckel 
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and, in some ways, commanded far more attention among serious biologists. Yet, 
like other morphological claims, Weismann’s theory was highly speculative—the 
ids, determinants, and biophors were all hypothetical entities—and thus ultimately 
came to be regarded by younger investigators in the 20th century as futile because 
their existence, and thus their ascribed functions, was untestable (Allen 1978a).
Mendelism and Particulate Heredity
Under the pervasive influence of the atomic-molecular theory that was so 
prominent in the physical sciences in the latter half of the 19th century, students of 
heredity framed their theories in physico-chemical terms (as particles or atomistic 
units). Whether in terms of visible structures like chromosomes, sub-chromosomal 
components, or imaginary entities like gemmules, plastidules or biophors, the germ 
plasm was seen as a collection of units each in some way controlling a specific 
character or trait of the adult organism. Geneticist-turned-historian Leslie C. Dunn 
(1965) has referred to these germinal elements as “living units” (33) and, as we 
have seen in the case of both Weismann and Haeckel, this is not an inappropriate 
designation. In the late 19th century, with the spectacular advances in organic 
chemistry, much of it in Germany, the line between the organic and living and the 
Figure 2
Two examples of Weismann’s representation of idants (chromosomes), with particulate ids (black ovals, 
left; lettered boxes, right) arranged along their length. Both show alignment of ids when the chromosomes 
have replicated. Ids contain all the hereditary material needed to produce an individual organism, though 
each id might differ from others in slight ways.
Source: Figure 2a from Weismann 1892a, 91; 2b from Weismann 1892b, 137.
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inorganic and nonliving was becoming increasingly blurred. But whether the term 
“living” was applied to germinal elements or not, the crucial feature was that these 
units were discrete and, at some level, thought to be composed of complex molecules. 
These various approaches were all a reflection of an underlying commitment to 
mechanistic materialism that, by 1900, characterized biology in general, and the 
study of heredity in particular.
It was in the tradition of these earlier, corpuscular notions of heredity that the 
rediscovery of Mendel’s work occurred, and thus conditioned the ways in which 
early-20th-century geneticists framed the new concept of the gene.
The Mechanistic Gene
There has been much discussion among both historians and philosophers of biology 
about what was meant by the term gene in the early decades of the 20th century. How 
did it relate to Mendel’s “Factors,” “Anlagen,” or “Elemente”; to Bateson’s concept 
of “unit-characters” or “allelomorphs”; to the instrumentalist “gene” of Johannsen, 
E. M. East, and T. H. Morgan; and finally, to the functional/physiological focus of 
developmental geneticists such as Richard Goldschmidt or Boris Ephrussi (Burian 
2005; Falk 2009; Gilbert 1978; Orel 2010). Nevertheless, despite these differences, 
as historian-philosopher Richard Burian (2005) has pointed out, there were core 
ideas on which various workers at the time could agree when they used the term 
gene that were independent of the investigators’ ontological positions about whether 
genes were real material entities or occupied distinct positions on the chromosomes.
That core position followed the basic mechanistic view that genes could be 
treated heuristically like the atoms of the chemist: they were discrete entities 
whose assortment and re-assortment followed certain statistical rules and could be 
used to make predictions, which could then be tested by making the appropriate 
experimental cross. The genotype, and in many ways the resulting phenotype, of 
the organism was thus a mosaic of particles (genes, making up the genotype) and 
characters (distinguishable traits making up the phenotype) of the adult. Such 
particles were, for the most part, independent of each other, and their history did 
not matter—that is, like atoms, whatever combinations any particular gene had 
participated in during previous generations did not matter to its functioning in the 
current generation. What was important was how genes combined and recombined 
in each new generation to produce particular combinations of characters. As Bateson 
put it as early as 1901:
Insofar as Mendel’s law applies, the conclusion is forced upon us that a living or-
ganism is a complex of characters of which some, at least, are dissociable and are 
capable of being replaced by others. We thus reach the conception of unit charac-
ters, which may be rearranged in the formation of reproductive cells. It is hardly 
too much to say that the experiments which led to this advance in knowledge 
are worthy to rank with those that laid the foundation of the Atomic laws of 
Chemistry. (qtd. in Punnett 1928, 2:1)
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Or, as he stated a year later in a speech to the New York Horticultural Congress: 
“The organism is a collection of traits. We can pull out yellowness and plug in 
greenness, pull out tallness and plug in dwarfness” (qtd. in Levins and Lewontin 
1985, 180).
The early Mendelian notation made perfect sense in its correspondence to a 
generalized particulate, or atomistic, concept of heredity: T stood for the discrete 
entity that determined tallness, and t for a similar, alternative entity that determined 
dwarfness. For committed mechanistic materialists like T. H. Morgan, it did not 
make a difference whether T and t were totally operational units or were real 
material entities. From my reading of Morgan, however, it seems clear that he did 
believe genes were in some form physical, molecular entities in the real world, but 
knowing what they were or how they functioned was not crucial to explaining 
their behavior during recombination or during their interactions, as in epistasis. By 
contrast, Bateson’s much stronger commitment to a non-materialist epistemology, 
and thus his unwillingness to consider genes as associated with physical structures 
like chromosomes, led to his description of genes as abstractions, what he called 
“stable resonances,” and to his complex hypotheses of “attraction and repulsion,” 
and later “reduplication,” to explain the phenomena of linkage and recombination. 
Morgan, despite his agnostic position on what genes actually were, was nevertheless 
upfront about his philosophical preference for a materialist explanation when he 
Figure 3
Depiction of chromosomes as composed of subunits, discrete genes arranged in a linear order, like beads on 
a string.  This figure shows a homologous pair of chromosomes undergoing chiasmata and crossing-over, 
exchanging genes. This figure shows clearly the discrete, atomistic way in which genes were conceived as 
parts of chromosomes, as well as the process of exchanging parts that formed the basis of their mapping 
procedure.
Source: Morgan et al. 1915, 60.
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and his colleagues wrote in the first edition of The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity 
in 1915: “Why, then, we are often asked, do you drag in the chromosomes? Our 
answer is that since the chromosomes furnish exactly the kind of mechanism that the 
Mendelian laws call for; and since there is an ever-increasing body of information 
that points clearly to the chromosomes as the bearers of the Mendelian factors, it 
would be folly to close one’s eyes to so patent a relationship” (viii). And clearly, the 
early depictions of the chromosome as a series of genes—the so-called “beads on 
a string” model—visually reinforced their particulate, atomistic nature (Figure 3). 
This rampant atomism was carried even further by R. A. Fisher who, in establishing 
the basis of population genetics, claimed that the mechanistic conception of the 
gene would do for evolution what the kinetic theory of gases had done for physics. 
The study of natural selection, he wrote in 1922: “may be compared to the analytic 
treatment of the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make the most varied 
assumptions as to the accidental circumstances and even the essential nature of the 
individual molecules, and yet to develop the general laws as to the behavior of gases, 
leaving but a few fundamental constants to be determined by experiment” (321–22; 
qtd. in Provine 1971, 149).
What I want to emphasize is that whatever the ultimate ontological view that 
biologists held about the nature of genes themselves, most tended to treat them 
heuristically as particulate elements, in most cases presumed to have some actual 
material existence, though of an unknown nature: perhaps as enzymes, hormones, 
or some other kind of complex organic molecule.
This original, simplistic conception of particulate inheritance quickly began 
to undergo various modifications, however, as new patterns emerged in breeding 
experiments. Gene interactions (epistasis), quantitative inheritance, position effects, 
the balance theory of sex determination all forced some reconceptualization of the 
mechanistic materialist concept of the gene. However, most if not all of the newer 
phenomena could be explained by some modifications of the original Mendelian 
paradigm, so the basic core of the corpuscular gene remained intact throughout 
the period of classical genetics. Thus, despite vocal opponents, including those 
with a special concern for embryonic development, such as Richard Goldschmidt, 
Edwin Grant Conklin and Albert Dalcq, the core notion of separate, discrete entities 
remained central to evolving understandings of the gene as both a structural and 
functional element. It was retained precisely because it was eminently successful in 
the early development of genetics as a new experimental science. It put biology in 
general and genetics in particular on the same footing as chemistry and physics.
I would now like to turn to one of the most important of the other factors that 
augmented—indeed, provided the basis for—the rapid development of Mendelian 
genetics: how the corpuscular gene resonated well with the developing economic 
imperative to move capital into the industrialization of agriculture in the early 20th 
century.
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The Movement of Capital and Expansion  
of Agriculture, 1890–1950
In recent decades, a number of authors have discussed the mounting desire in 
the early 20th century to industrialize agriculture and to develop more reliable 
methods of animal and plant breeding (Berlan and Lewontin 1986; Fitzgerald 2003; 
Harwood 1997; Kloppenburg 1988; Levins and Lewontin 1985; Palladino 1990, 
1994). In this process, the application of the new science of Mendelian genetics 
increasingly seemed to provide direction. Several of these authors (Berlan and 
Lewontin, and Kloppenburg) have explicitly placed their analyses in the framework 
of Marx’s theory of the movement of capital—that is, the need in a market, 
investment-driven economy to move capital from one sphere to another where 
profits can be higher, and to beat others to the draw in the process. (This analysis is 
admirably applied to the Human Genome Initiative by Rodney Loeppke [2005]). 
In this investment drive, science and technology have historically played crucial 
roles. Central to this notion is the commodification of agricultural products—that 
is, their production for sale, rather than for one’s own use. Applied to agriculture, 
this has meant commodification of animals and plants with specific values, such as 
high productivity, low resistance to disease, and other marketable phenotypic traits.
It is clear that in the period of the later 19th century and throughout most of 
the 20th century, capital expansion into agriculture moved rapidly and aggressively. 
There are two major reasons for this. First, industrial growth in the latter half of 
the 19th century led to capital accumulation and thus the need for new arenas 
of expansion. Investors had always looked to agriculture as one possibility for 
expansion, since food was one commodity that was always going to be in demand. 
Second,  industrialization had been accompanied by urbanization and the migration 
of workers to cities, creating more consumers and fewer farm hands as producers. 
The net result of this demographic shift was pressure for increased agricultural 
productivity outside of the traditional family farm, which often operated just slightly 
above subsistence level and depended largely on non-mechanized manual labor and 
its own inputs, such as animal power, natural fertilizers, and seeds saved from the 
previous year’s harvest.
However, traditional agriculture had always posed difficulties for high-level 
investment: land was expensive and limited, climate was variable and unpredictable, 
and animal and plant husbandry was based on empirical rules-of-thumb that were 
neither very predictable nor easily brought into the large-scale market system. 
More important, traditional farms were small—cottage industries in a way—and 
were seen as inefficient units operating each on its own methods and individualistic 
principles. As Deborah Fitzgerald has shown in her book, Every Farm a Factory 
(2003), the industrialization of agriculture was a much-discussed goal of many 
agronomists and potential investors from the 1880s onward. The rationalization 
of agriculture—that is, placing it on a scientific base—had already entered its first 
phase with the agricultural chemistry of Justus von Liebig at Giessen during the 
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mid-19th-century, which had focused on issues such as soil chemistry, animal 
and plant nutrition, and the use of fertilizers. While this movement had achieved 
considerable success, it had also encountered skepticism and controversy—and at 
any rate had begun to reach the limits of its effectiveness. By the 1890s, however, 
the Progressive-era ideology of “scientific management” and “industrial efficiency” 
in both Europe and the United States created an environment for rationalizing 
agriculture anew—but this time, in addition to issues of improvements to the 
environment, particular attention was being paid to improvements to the hereditary 
makeup of animal and plant varieties. By applying scientific methods of animal 
and plant breeding, production yields could be taken to the next higher level. 
Many other related economic sectors also saw industrialization of agriculture as 
potentially profitable: the farm machine industry (John Deere, Ford, International 
Harvester), the chemical fertilizer industry (W. R. Grace, Occidental Petroleum), 
the railroads (Illinois Central, Great Northern, Southern Pacific), and a growing 
food-processing industry (Del Monte, Heinz), especially canning. In addition, the 
rise of grain exchanges as a source for profitable commodities trading and the 
potential for producing food for export provided yet another avenue through 
which increased agricultural output could be potentially profitable.
That all of these various economic potentials came together to ultimately 
transform agriculture from small-scale farming to what later came to be known 
as “agribusiness” is indicated in Table 1. Note that over the 100-year period, the 
contributions of capital and labor almost completely reversed. A major feature 
of the industrialization process was also to move many agricultural inputs to off-
farm sources, where full-scale industrial relations of production already existed in 
full-swing: the production of farm machinery, fertilizer, and later pesticides—all of 
which under traditional practice were largely inputs from the farm itself—to the 
point where farming became what Jack Kloppenburg (1988) has referred to as “the 
most capital-intensive sector of the modern capitalist economy” (31).
Table 1  changing agricultural parameters in the united states, 1870–1970
Year       Labor Input       Capital Input       Farms Over       Corn Harvested      % Corn 
        (% of Total)         (% of Total)         1,000 Acres        (Bushels/Acre)     as Hybrids 
      (in thousands)
1870 65 17 29 20 0
1900 57 24 47 25 0
1920 50 32 67 29 0
1940 41 41 101 30 15
1960 27 54 136 53 94
1970 19 58 216 70 95+
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1975, 1:467; Kloppenburg 1988, 89, 120. 
Note: It should be pointed out that not all of the gain in yield is due to genetics. New fertilizers, pesticides, 
and other inputs also contributed to the increases shown in bushels/acre.  Nevertheless, genetics did make a 
substantial contribution, especially after World War II. 
Garland E. Allen
24 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
So, how did the industrialization of agriculture impact genetics in any direct or 
measurable way, and in particular, how did it relate to the mechanistic view of the 
gene? There are several routes by which the capital expansion of agriculture had 
a major impact on the new field of genetics. Going back to the root of genetics 
itself, it is worth noting that Vitezslav Orel and Roger Wood, among others, have 
produced persuasive evidence that Mendel’s own work was carried out with 
agricultural interests in mind, and that he was trying to develop a systematic, 
scientific approach to understanding regularities, or patterns, of hybridization 
(Orel 1996; Orel and Wood 2000; Wood and Orel, 2001). He was not, as has been 
traditionally portrayed, trying to develop large-scale theoretical concepts of heredity 
in the Darwin, Haeckel, or Weismann mode. Thus, when Mendelian genetics was 
rediscovered, it already carried a certain agricultural tradition, or at least a ready-
made applicability to agriculture, embedded within it. It is not irrelevant to note 
that in 1902, when Bateson came to the United States, he wrote back to his wife 
that his most enthusiastic Mendelian supporters were farmers and agronomists. 
They greeted him at the railroad station in Ithaca, New York, for example, where 
he had been invited to speak by Liberty Hyde Bailey, the dean of the agricultural 
college at Cornell, who is reported as having waved copies of Bateson’s recent book, 
Mendel’s Principles: A Defense, shouting “Mendel, Mendel all the way!” (qtd. in Paul 
and Kimmelman 1988, 283).
But more directly, Mendel’s work appeared to provide the first set of breeding 
results that followed a regular pattern across a wide variety of species—both animal 
and plant—and that could be predicted with any reliability. While numerous 
anomalies and later alterations added to the complexity of the original Mendelian 
scheme, predictable results continued to emerge out of the basic methods of genetic 
analysis. An increasingly important component of Mendel’s work was his method: 
(1) the meticulous categorizing and measuring of discrete phenotypic characters; 
(2) the detailed record-keeping associated with making testable parental crosses and 
counting numerical ratios of offspring categories; (3) the repeatability of crosses 
made with statistically significant numbers of offspring; and (4) the importance of 
controlled conditions. These practices all made Mendelian genetics appear to be 
the rational, scientific approach to animal and plant breeding that had heretofore 
been lacking. It was what Philip Thurtle (2007) has termed “the emergence of 
genetic rationality”—that is, the systematic approaches to collecting, recording, and 
organizing data/information applied specifically to genetics. Thurtle emphasizes that 
these methods had been developed to a high degree of efficiency by modern industry 
(since the 1860s) and included input and output tables, methods of tracking items 
over complex transportation systems, and the use of statistical analysis of consumer 
habits. That these practices were absolutely essential to the development of early 
genetic thinking is quite clear, but of course they were also standard methods in the 
physical sciences at the time, so it is not clear that emerging industrial practices were 
necessarily the only, or major, source of such thinking in the life sciences. However, 
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Thurtle argues persuasively that the emphasis on being systematic and rational was 
very much a component of Progressive-era thinking in general, and so was part and 
parcel of the development of industrial methods in particular. At any rate, Mendel’s 
methodology, his focus on discrete hereditary elements (whether material or symbolic 
is not crucial), and his highly rational, systematic approach made a perfect fit with the 
industrial ideal in general, and with industrial agriculture in particular.
Another feature of Progressive-era industrialization was the emphasis on 
standardization and uniformity. As Fitzgerald has shown in The Business of Breeding 
(1990), most varieties of corn in the Midwest were highly variable, as they 
were adapted to local conditions and could not be grown as well when planted 
elsewhere—even a few counties away. If we consider just seed production as part 
of the industrialization of agriculture, this would be equivalent to manufacturing 
different automobiles for every city or town—hardly an attractive approach for 
efficiency and large-scale profit. Mendel’s methods, especially the theory of 
inbreeding and outbreeding as developed by E. M. East, George Harrison Shull, and 
others, offered the prospect of achieving a kind of uniformity in seed production 
and growth that appealed to industrial modes of production.
But what about the mechanistic gene itself: why did it have a greater appeal than, 
say, a non-particulate theory of heredity? In the latter case, “blood” or “blending” 
theories of inheritance had been prominent for centuries and made it difficult to 
conceive of ways to keep a breed or variety stable and pure. Full mixing of hereditary 
contributions from bi-parental reproduction tended toward homogenization of the 
germinal material and thus would “swamp” any new variations that arose. (This had 
been one of Darwin’s major difficulties, since he did believe in a form of blending 
inheritance.) Particulate theories, however, could avoid this problem, since if particles 
of heredity, like atoms of chemistry, retained their integrity and basic properties from 
one combination to another, they would not be lost in subsequent generations, even 
if they were recessive or became latent.
However, particulate theories also had two additional appeals. First, mechanistic 
materialist views grew up with the machine analogy, as the foundation of these views 
derived directly from the rapid introduction of various forms of machine-based 
labor (in mining, transport, textiles, and the like) in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Since mechanistic thinking clearly dominated the metaphorical landscape of the 
industrial revolution and beyond, the idea of a genome composed of separable parts 
that could be “plugged in” and “taken out” at will, without altering the whole 
organization of the machine/organism, was likely to have resonated well with those 
frustrated by traditional methods of breeding, in which new traits were constantly 
being lost or modified in unpredictable ways. To make the analogy explicit, in a bill 
introduced into the U.S. Congress in 1906 to patent seeds, one proponent stated 
that “every seed is a mechanism as is a trolley car.”
A second way the mechanistic gene would have fit in well with the ideology 
of industrial agriculture is that genes provided the basis for differentiating between 
varieties as commodities: they are the real, substantive differences between one strain 
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of wheat, corn, or poultry and another. While it was not possible to patent genes at 
the time (legal battles over that issue would come only much later), it was possible 
to construct hybrids or particular genetic combinations from strains only the seed 
producer maintained—and of course, since hybrids do not breed true, they become 
a true commodity in that they must be bought anew every season.2 The fact that 
many hybrids were more vigorous and gave higher yields than most inbred strains 
(known as heterosis or “hybrid vigor”) was the special selling point, compensating 
for the added expenses they incurred, such as increased fertilizer and pesticide inputs, 
large farm machinery for plowing and harvesting, and having to purchase new seeds 
every year. In this way, hybrid seeds favored the larger, industrialized farmer, who 
could make the system work profitably only by growing on a large scale (Berlan and 
Lewontin 1986; Levins and Lewontin 1985).
Mendelian genetics certainly was not the only system of heredity that could have 
been, or was, the focus of attempts to increase agricultural yield during the period of 
the industrialization of agriculture. Nor did profit-driven investors simply “invent” 
out of whole cloth a genetics that fit their specific needs. In the United States 
and Europe, numerous agronomists were initially attracted to alternative theories 
of heredity in addition to Mendel: for example, de Vries’s mutation theory (United 
States, Germany) and neo-Lamarckism (France, Germany, Soviet Union). What is 
important to emphasize here—and I think it applies to the interaction of science, 
technology, and capitalist development overall—is that in any historical epoch, a 
variety of approaches exist in the scientific/technological sphere from which those 
with the funds to control research choose, in order to solve the particular economic 
problems at hand. Thus science, technology, and the development of capital have 
both independent and interdependent lines of development that can converge on 
occasion to push science/technology along one line rather than another. But it is 
ultimately the sources of funds coupled with the science/technology that is available, 
in either partially developed or undeveloped forms, that determines which research 
gets pursued and which does not.
Although all this sounds logical enough, how do we know such realizations 
were consciously recognized and promoted in a Mendelian context? From a 
historiographical point of view, there has been much controversy about whether 
genetics did in fact have, or was ever expected to have, much real impact on the 
development of 20th-century agriculture. Individuals from a variety of sectors 
of American society in the early 20th century—scientists, industrialists, potential 
investors, and government officials—all had high hopes for a scientific agriculture 
that would provide increased yields, more efficient means of production, and 
considerable profit.
2Shull’s and Jones’s double-cross method of seed production involved creating two hybrid strains and 
then crossing the offspring with each other, so that the segregation of traits in future generations was 
insured. Thus there was virtually no likelihood that any of the original parental combinations would be 
retained in future offspring.
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It is probably no exaggeration to state that one of the most potent investors and 
capitalists in the early 20th century was Andrew Carnegie. In his philanthropic 
efforts to fund biological science, in 1903 he established the Carnegie Institution 
of Washington (CIW), one of whose main aims was to promote a scientific 
approach to agriculture. At a meeting of the Scientific Advisor Board of the CIW 
in December 1908, part of the discussion revolved around whether to continue 
funding the work of plant breeder and “Wizard of Santa Rosa” (California), Luther 
Burbank (1849–1926). Burbank was becoming famous for creating all sorts of new 
varieties of fruits, vegetables, and ornamental plants. He worked by a combination 
of practical experience, trial-and-error, and some self-taught biological principles, 
including grafting and hybridization. The Directors had raised questions about the 
relative contribution of scientific theory to commercial products coming out of 
Burbank’s work (Rheingold 1979). After listening to the discussion for a while, 
Carnegie chipped in: “My friend here said the only thing we expect is a scientific 
report, and my other friend here said the only thing we would get would be an 
economic result. . . . I would like to know what our scientific reports avail us if the 
end be not economic gain, that we shall get plants which will yield revenue . . .?” 
(CIW 1908)
Clearly, supporting agricultural research that would lead to “economic gain” 
was an important criterion for the CIW’s decision about which research to 
support. Although controversial from the scientific point of view, so highly was 
Burbank regarded by some scientists—Liberty Hyde Bailey, Hugo de Vries, and 
David Starr Jordan (then President of Stanford University), among others—that 
the entire CIW Committee of the Division of Biology visited Santa Rosa in 1906 
to inspect his work; they also decided that George Harrison Shull, a pioneer in 
hybrid corn breeding, should spend a part of the next several summers working 
with Burbank, recording and evaluating his methods (Glass 1980). While the CIW 
ultimately withdrew their support after Shull found the work had no underlying 
scientific foundation, it did fund, in 1904, the Station for Experimental Evolution at 
Cold Spring Harbor, New York, whose Director, Charles B. Davenport, set up the 
institution specifically to pursue studies on heredity and selection in agriculturally 
important animals and plants (Allen 1986, 2004). This included not only Davenport’s 
own work on breeding chickens, but also Shull’s early work on hybrid corn, which 
was carried out at the station from 1904 until 1915. Later, as the CIW’s Department 
of Genetics, the Station served as the research home of Barbara McClintock, who 
also worked on maize, from 1941 until 1992. Through external grants, the CIW also 
funded a variety of genetics research programs, most notably that of T. H. Morgan 
and his group at Columbia University (1915–1928) and thereafter at the California 
Institute of Technology. The CIW was thus a major financial backer for work in 
heredity with a distinct leaning toward agricultural development.
Scientists at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) were equally excited 
about new prospects for introducing scientific breeding into agricultural practice 
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at the turn of the century (Paul and Kimmelman 1988). Several, such as Willett M. 
Hays of the USDA Experiment Station in Minnesota, W. J. Spillman at the USDA 
in Washington, and H. J. Webber at the USDA Experiment Station in Florida, 
were all involved in founding the American Breeders’ Association in 1903, an 
organization designed to bring together academic biologists and practical breeders 
to exchange ideas in many areas of mutual interest (Kimmelman 1983, 1997; Paul 
and Kimmelman 1988). The organization’s journal (at first the ABA Annual Report, 
and from 1910–1913, The American Breeders’ Magazine) published articles side-by-
side on theoretical issues of Mendelian genetics or Hugo de Vries’s controversial 
“mutation theory” and on breeding pears, carnations, or horses. Many supporters 
of this new movement, such as Hays, saw the immense economic potential in 
harnessing the “power of heredity” to improve animal and plant production. Hays 
once calculated that investing $100,000 in creative breeding would lead annually to 
$100 million in gross returns (Hays 1905a). He also noted that a great advantage of 
breeding was that, once developed, the new strains would reproduce themselves in 
perpetuity (Hays 1905b).
Similar views were expressed a few years later at the highest level of the USDA. 
In 1910, Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson was invited to write an introduction 
to the newly transformed American Breeders Magazine. In his short three-page 
introduction, Wilson noted the important potential that lay in the new approach to 
animal and plant breeding:
Recent work in heredity and improved breeding has inaugurated a new era in 
research, in improved methods, and in the demand by growers for improved 
plants and animals. . . . Judging from achievements already accomplished, 10 
per cent is a conservative estimate of the increase which can thus be made. . . . 
Improvements by breeding are unlike those secured by adding new acres to the 
cultivated areas of the country, by deeper plowing, by more frequently culti-
vating the crop, by adding to the soil larger supplies of fertilizers, or by giving 
a more expensive ration to farm animals. These improvements, though they 
greatly increase the farmers’ profits, are secured at a cost which sometimes equals 
the value of the added product. But the cost of improvements through breed-
ing usually represents only a small fraction of the added values. The increase of 
products secured by breeding pays the cost in a short time, and, since there is no 
further expense, the annual increase afterward is pure profit. (4–5)
Wilson went on to note that a new scientific approach to breeding would have 
economic spin-offs well beyond the breeding industry itself: “The farmer will be 
able to retain a part of the larger production in the form of added profit, and 
part will help reduce the cost of living to those in our cities. Larger production 
on the farm will also give increased business for the transportation company, the 
manufacturer, and the merchant, and will provide the nation was a larger product 
with which to hold our balance of trade” (5).
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Wilson was right, as many other industrial developments would benefit from 
increased agricultural output. One was the railroads. In an attempt to increase their 
business from farmers, railroads even initiated various extension programs, bringing 
farmers and genetics experts together in railroad car classrooms (Figure 4), where the 
latest findings in various areas of agronomy would be presented (Amidon 2008). At 
the time, Wilson failed to see that seed companies would not find much incentive in 
producing new strains that the farmer only bought once, but the general principle 
that breeding results can provide higher profits because the organism reproduces its 
improved traits was clear enough to act as a significant incentive.
Biologists working on the improvement of the hereditary makeup of 
agriculturally important plants and animals also saw the economic potential to be 
gained from scientific breeding. Edward Murray East at Harvard and his student 
Donald F. Jones, later at the Connecticut Agricultural Station at Storrs, were major 
contributors to understanding the effects of hybridization in corn. In their highly 
influential publication of 1919, Inbreeding and Outbreeding, they noted that hybrids 
would provide the way for seed companies to develop a product that would at 
last be profitable. Mendelism, they wrote: “is not a method that will interest most 
farmers, but it is something that may easily be taken up by seedsmen; in fact, it 
is the first time in agricultural history that a seedsman is enabled to gain the full 
benefit from a desirable origination of his own” (224). East and Jones did go on to 
Figure 4
Demonstration train showing a lecture by Iowa State University 
extension service representative giving a talk on “Seed Germination.”
Source: Amidon 2008, 325.
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point out that in contrast to other types of inventions, which can be patented, the 
legal obstacles to patenting seeds and organisms reduced the incentive for private 
investment. However, as they pointed out: “The utilization of the first generation 
hybrids enables the originator to keep the parental types and give out only the 
crossed seeds, which are less valuable for continued propagation” (224).
One further example will indicate the degree to which academic biology, in 
the form of Mendelian genetics, was seen as a viable handmaiden to agricultural 
improvement in the Progressive era. In perusing the correspondence files between 
T. H. Morgan and Raymond Pearl at the American Philosophical Society several 
years ago, a proposal turned up to establish a Department of Genetics at Columbia 
University, written somewhere around 1920. Typewritten but unsigned, it seemingly 
was intended to be submitted (or perhaps was submitted) to the Columbia 
administration. Although no such department was created, the rationale for doing 
so placed agricultural interests at the forefront:
The science of genetics is fundamental for all agriculture. By purely empirical 
methods breeders have brought certain of the domestic animals to a high state of 
development. But an exact and comprehensive knowledge of how these results 
have been attained, and may be attained again, is, in general, lacking. In the last 
decade definite knowledge of the laws of inheritance has made greater advance 
than in the entire previous history of mankind. (Morgan Correspondence, Ray-
mond Pearl Papers, American Philosophical Society, pp. 1–2)
Even granting that applications for new resources (funds, departments, facilities) 
may have overemphasized the importance of practical outcomes, it is noteworthy 
that such a department was proposed in the first place for a high-level research 
institution such as Columbia University. Similarly, the fact that the application of 
Mendelian principles to agricultural improvement did not pay off immediately and 
the industrialization of agriculture did not begin to become profitable until the 
1940s does not negate the immediate importance that was attached to supporting 
genetic work in the first three decades of the 20th century. Without that support, I 
argue, genetics certainly would not have developed as rapidly as it did, nor perhaps 
have engendered as much enthusiasm and excitement among biologists and 
agronomists alike. As just one indication of how agricultural interests contributed to 
the development of genetics, the Appendix provides a partial list of major geneticists 
in the United States and Europe who worked in agriculturally related institutions 
or were directly funded by agricultural interests. While many of these geneticists 
were not always motivated by specific agricultural applications, agriculturally based 
institutional or financial resources allowed them to pursue the work in a way, and at 
a pace, that otherwise would have been difficult or impossible.
Finally, the growth of genetics rode high on the wave of professionalization that 
was sweeping through the life sciences in the early 20th century, as it had through 
the physical sciences in the latter half of the 19th century (Appel 1988; Palladino 
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1994). Indeed, genetics became the crown jewel for biologists wishing to become 
as professionally recognized as physicists and chemists, and to be comparable in 
the analytical quality and rigor of their science. Genetics had all the earmarks 
associated with the high-status physical sciences: it was experimental, quantitative, 
mathematical, and predictive. It was based on a corpuscular view like the atomic-
molecular theory. Philosophically, it provided a method for rigorously testing and 
confirming or rejecting hypotheses. It was mechanistic and atomistic without the 
large-scale speculations associated with Weismann, Haeckel, or others of the previous 
generation. I would argue that one of the reasons young biologists so promoted 
experimentalism as an ideal was that it signified the new, professionalized side of 
the life sciences that was emerging—especially in the form of genetics—at the 
time. Thus genetics suited the needs not only of agricultural breeders, government, 
and investors, but also of a burgeoning group of young and some not-so-young 
biologists seeking increased status, positions, and funding for their work.
All of these strands came together to help propel genetics to the forefront of 
the life sciences, and to give biology as a whole increasing stature among the 
sciences—a stature that has only continued to increase through the era of molecular 
genetics down to the present day. The whole second half of the 20th century saw 
another massive wave of capital movement into genetics, not only in the agricultural 
realm with GMOs, but now greatly augmented by the medical and pharmaceutical 
industries. Clearly by now, genetics has become one of the biggest players in the 
global economy.
Conclusion
The idea of the corpuscular—discrete and atomistic—gene that became the 
dominant paradigm for genetics in the first half of the 20th century rose to 
prominence from the confluences of several economic, social, and intellectual 
factors, without which the field could not have developed so rapidly and expanded 
so widely as it did. These factors include: the rediscovery of Mendel’s work on 
hybridization; the economic forces promoting the rapid expansion of agriculture to 
keep up with the needs of a growing urban, non-agricultural work force; and the 
need for new arenas of investment that reconfigured agriculture along industrial 
lines; and the needs of a growing community of biologists aiming to professionalize 
their field and raise its status among the sciences as a whole. Behind all this was the 
new ideology of progressivism in the United States and its counterparts (such as 
the industrial and national efficiency movements in Britain and Germany), which 
encompassed managed (regulated) capitalism, rational planning, efficiency, and 
the call for stronger, centralized government regulation of the economy and its 
institutions.
The corpuscular or atomized view of the gene fit well into this complex of 
economic, social, and intellectual developments: it was measurable, it could be 
manipulated and its effects predicted, and because it was a material entity, it could 
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ultimately be commodified. It was also a simplified view that could be communicated 
and presented in textbooks and even applied to the solution of social problems in 
the form of eugenics, whose motto was “the self-direction of human evolution.” 
But these added values to the genetic capital came with a price. They led many 
biologists to promote a simpler picture of what genes were and what they do than 
ultimately turned out to be the case. This oversimplified view in turn led to serious 
social claims in the name of eugenics that extended beyond the eugenic era to 
today—to the ideology of genetic determinism, the claim that genes are the basis 
for much of human social behavior and personality traits. “Genes for” alcoholism, 
criminality, IQ, religiosity, or laziness remain one of the most troublesome legacies 
of the atomistic gene concept.
The relationship between economic and social factors and the rise of the 
corpuscular gene is not, however, a matter of simple cause-and-effect, in which 
capital investment requires a marketable produce and science/technology provides 
it. Rather, the economic and social conditions provide an environment in which 
certain investment opportunities are available, or seem to have potential; these are 
encouraged in various ways through private funding (the CIW) or government 
support (the USDA and its network of Experiment Stations). Various scientific 
technologies may be available in well- or less well-developed forms, and one or 
more of these may be promoted at the same time or in tandem. Other scenarios 
exist in which an economic need stimulates research to find a particular solution, 
as in selection for resistance of wheat to infection by rust (Puccinia graminis). The 
point is that while there is no one-to-one or linear relationship between economic 
imperatives and scientific/technological outcomes, the former do provide the 
conditions in which the latter develop. All of the developments discussed above 
existed in an environment in which agriculture was being expanded along an 
industrial model that promoted large-scale production, commodification (and 
standardization) of products, post-harvest longevity, disease and drought resistance, 
predictability of yield and quality, and transportability. Particularly important, 
industrially developed agricultural commodities needed to be protected as private 
property, whether by patents or other means, in order to insure their investment 
return. In all of these respects, Mendelian theory in general, and its incarnation as 
the atomistic gene, fit the bill perfectly.
The entire Mendelian research program or paradigm promoted a quantitative, 
experimental approach to heredity that was, at one and the same time, based on 
a mechanistic materialist approach in tune with the prevailing ethos of the hard 
sciences. The atomistic gene concept could lead to predictable results, could be 
manipulated to provide novel combinations (analogous to the invention of machines 
with removable/exchangeable parts), and could be privatized by patenting the 
process for producing the strains (as in the double-cross method) or by maintaining 
exclusive combinations of traits in parental forms owned only by the breeders. 
Ultimately, even as early as the first decade of the 20th century, it was hoped that 
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individual genes or combinations of genes could someday be subject to individual 
patents (which has now happened ). While the products of other hereditarian 
approaches—blending inheritance, neo-Lamarckism, or de Vriesian mutations—
might have seemed able to meet some of these needs at the outset, the fact that 
they did not produce predictable results eventually led to their rejection. Mendelian 
genetics survived not only because it was the most successful theoretical approach 
to understanding heredity to have been developed to date, but it also appeared 
early on to offer the most viable approach to a new, mechanized and industrialized 
agriculture that would provide a new arena for investment in the Progressive Era.
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Appendix   geneticists associated with agricultural or commercial organiza-
tions and institutions or funded by them
Name/ Education/                                      Areas of Work 
Dates Institutional 
 Affiliations
ANDERSON,  BA, U of Michigan; PhD, Cornell  maize genetics 
Ernest Gustav  under R. A. Emerson (1920)    
(1891–1973)   
ANDERSON,  BA, Michigan State; DSc under East  genetics of Nicotiana and Zea
Edgar S.   at Bussey Institution, Harvard (1922);  maize; population genetics of 
(1897–1969) Missouri Botanical Garden (1922–29,  hybridization (Introgressive Hybridization,  
  1937-67); John Innes Horticultural  1949); consultant for Pioneer Hybrid 
  Institution (1929–31)
BABCOCK, E. B  BA, Lawrence College; PhD, U of  genetics of Crepis; reorganized 
(1877–1954) California, Berkeley College of Agriculture;  curriculum at UC College of 
  Prof, UC–Berkeley (1908–47)  Agriculture, founded Dept of Genetics  
      (1913)
BATESON, William  AB, Cambridge; Prof of Genetics,   introduced Mendelism to the 
(1861–1926) Cambridge (1908); John Innes   English-speaking world; coined term 
  Horticultural Institute (1910)  genetics; genetics of poulfry
BEADLE, George W.  BA, MA, Nebraska College of Agriculture; crossing-over in maize; compendium of 
(1903-1989) PhD, Cornell under Emerson (1930); post- maize chromosome loci; genetic func- 
  doc, Caltech (1930–35); Professor, Harvard  tion in Drosophila and with E. L. Tatum 
  (1936–37), Stanford (1937–46); Caltech  in Neurospora; maize origins 
  (1946–61); President, U of Chicago (1961–68)
BLAKESLEE,  BA, Wesleyan; PhD, Harvard (1904); genetics of Datura, a noxious agricultural 
Albert F. (1874–1954) Connecticut Agricultural College (1904–15);  weed; use of colchicine to induce 
  Station for Experimental Evolution, Cold  poly-ploidy, promoted de Vries’s 
  Spring Harbor (1915–41)  mutation theory
BURBANK, Luther  no formal education; CIW grants (1904–9) inspired by Darwin’s Variations to become 
(1849–1926)      a plant breeder, Santa Rosa, CA (1875–
1926); breeding, grafting plant varieties; 
new fruits and vegetables; Burbank Seeds; 
admired by de Vries, E. B. Babcock, and 
D.S. Jordan
CASTLE, William E.  BA, Denison U, Harvard; PhD, Harvard (1895);  early Mendelian; mammalian genetics;  
(1867–1962) Bussey Institution, Harvard (1897–1936)  genetics of coat color; effects of selection 
on genes; genetics of horses
CREIGHTON,  BA,Wellesley; PhD, College of Agriculture,  student of Emerson and McClintock;  
Harriet B. (1909– Cornell (1933); Instructor, Cornell (1932–34),  cytological proof of crossing-over in maize 
2004)  Connecticut College, Wellesley (1934–74) 
DARLINGTON,  BA, Southeastern Agricultural College, Wye; chromosomal variation and evolution 
Cyril D. (1903–1981) Cytologist, John Innes Horticultural Institution   
  (1924–37), Director (1937–53); Sheradian Prof   
  of Botany, Oxford (1953–61) 
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DAVENPORT,  BA, Harvard; PhD, under E. L. Mark (1892);  early Mendelian; genetics of chickens, 
Charles B. (1866–1944) Professor, U of Chicago (1899–1904);   other agriculturally important animals 
  Director, Station for Experimental Evolution,   and plants; eugenics 
  Cold Spring Harbor (1904–34), funded   
  by the Carnegie Institution of Washington  
  (CIW)
DUNN, Leslie C.  BA, Dartmouth College; PhD, Bussey genetics of rabbits, mice; at Storrs, 
(1893–1974) Institution under Castle (1920); Connecticut  chickens; developmental genetics of 
  Agricultural Station (1920–28); Prof of  T-locus (tailless) in mice 
  Zoology, Columbia U (1928–62) 
EAST, Edward M.  BA, U of Illinois; PhD, U of Illinois (1907);  chemistry of oil production and later 
(1879–1938)  Connecticut Agricultural Station (1905–9);  genetics of hybrid corn, especially inbreed- 
  Bussey Institution, Harvard, (1909–38) ing and out-breeding
EMERSON,  BS, Nebraska College of Agriculture; Editor, variegation in pericarp coloration in 
Rollins A.   USDA; Lecturer/Asst Prof, U of Nebraska calico maize, demonstrating Mendel’s 
(1873–1947)  until 1914; Prof, Cornell (1914–47)  laws in maize (color patterns)
FISHER, Ronald A.  BA, Cambridge; Statistician, City of London statistical analysis of variance and 
(1890–1962) (1914–18); Statistician, Rothamstad   foundations of population genetics 
  Experimental Station (1919–33); Galton  (1930); eugenics; decline of western 
  Prof of Eugenics, U College, London  civilization 
  (1933–43); Balfour Prof of Genetics,    
  Cambridge (1943–retirement); Visiting Prof   
  of Statistics, Iowa State (1935–36)  
JOHANNSEN,  Asst in Chemistry, Carlsberg Laboratory genotype-phenotype distinction, pure line 
Wilhelm (1857–1927)  (1881), Copenhagen Ag College (1892–1905),  theory; limits of selection in pure-line 
  U of Copenhagen (1905–27)  populations
JONES, Donald F.  BA, Kansas State Agricultural College; PhD, hybrid corn, double-cross method;  
(1890–1963) Bussey Institution, Harvard (1916); Arizona  cytoplasmic male sterility (CMS) 
  Experiment Station (1911–14); Connecticut   
  Agricultural Station (1915–60) 
LANDAUER, Walter  PhD, Heidelberg (1922); Prof of Animal genetics of development (chickens),  
(1896–1978) Genetics, U of Connecticut, Connecticut  specifically the relation of specific gene 
  Agricultural Station, Storrs (1924–64) mutations to abnormalities of development
McCLINTOCK,  BS, Cornell; PhD, Cornell (1927); Prof, U cytogenetics of maize and proof of 
Barbara (1902–1992) of Missouri and USDA, Columbia, MO  crossing-over; transposable elements 
  (1936–41); Dept of Genetics, Carnegie  in maize; genetic control of development 
  Institution of Washington (CIW), Cold  via cytoplasmic signaling 
  Spring Harbor Laboratory (1941–92) 
NILSSON-EHLE,  Candidate and Licentiate degrees, U of one of first to demonstrate that 
Hermann (1873–1949) Lund; PhD, Lund (1909); Chair of Plant  economically important plants followed 
  Physiology, U of Lund (1915), Genetics  Mendelian laws; Mendelian basis of 
  (1917); Swedish Seed Association, Svalöf,  quantitative inheritance (1908–11) 
  Assistant (1900), Director (1925–39), 
PEARL, Raymond  BA, Dartmouth; PhD, U of Michigan  genetics of poultry and cattle; effects of 
(1879–1940)  (1902); Head, Dept of Biology, Maine  alcohol on germ cells; application of 
  Agricultural Station (1907–18); Head,  statistics to animal and human breeding, 
  US Food Administration (1917–19); Prof  life cycles and population growth 
  of Biometry, Johns Hopkins (1918–40) 
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RHODES, Marcus M.  BA, MS, U of Michigan; PhD, Cornell, cytoenetics of maize; cyto-plasmic male 
(1903–1991)  under R. A. Emerson (1932); Research  sterility and iojap gene-chloroplast 
  Fellow, Cornell (1932–35); Research   interaction; preferential segregation in 
  Geneticist USDA, Ames, IA (1935–37);  abnormal chromosome 10; numerous 
  Arlington Experimental Farm, VA   theoretical and practical problems in 
  (1937–40); Prof, Columbia U (1940–48);  genetics of maize 
  Prof, U of Illinois (1948–58); Prof, Indiana   
  U (1958–74)
SHULL, George  BA, Antioch; PhD, U of Chicago (1904);  worked on cytology of Oenothera, 
Harrison (1874–1954) US Bureau of Plant Industry; Station for  hybridization in maize and peas; 
  Experimental Evolution, CSH (1904–15);  studied heterosis; methods of 
  Prof of Biology, Princeton (1915–42)  out-crossing inbred lines to improve 
      crop yields
STADLER, Lewis J.  BS, U of Florida; graduate study, Cornell,  X-ray and UV induction of mutations 
(1896–1954) with Emerson (1919); PhD, U of Missouri  in field crops, especially corn 
  (1922); Prof, Dept of Field Crops, U of  
  Missouri/USDA (1922–54)
TSCHERMAK,   Agricultural Diploma, U of Halle;  breeding disease-resistant hybrids of rye,  
Erich von Seysenegg  PhD, U of Halle (1896); Prof, U  wheat, and oats 
(1871–1962) of Agricultural Sciences, Vienna (1901–?)
WRIGHT, Sewall  BSc, Lombard College; PhD, Bussey  mammalian genetics; physiology of 
(1889–1988) Institution, Harvard under Castle (1916);   pigmentation; cattle breeding; population 
  USDA in Washington, DC (1916–25);   genetics and genetic drift 
  Prof, Chicago (1925–55), Wisconsin  
  (1955–88)
ZELENY, Frank  BA, MA, U of Minnesota; PhD, U  Drosophila genetics: linkage, position 
(1878–1939) of Chicago (1901); Indiana U (1904–9);  effect, rates of back-mutation 
  Prof, U of Illinois, USDA Experiment Station,   
  Champaign-Urbana (1909–39)
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